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The paper discusses the implementation of decentralization in Central and 
Eastern Europe Countries after the signature and ratification of the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government. Decentralization as one of the reform 
approaches has several positive impacts on governance, but might have 
negative consequences, too. There are issues concerning allocation of financial 
resources, optimal territorial structure, weak local democracy. Local 
government units, especially the smaller ones, are not cost effective neither in 
administration nor in managing quality and expenditure of public services. For 
the reforms to realise the necessary democracy and efficiency, the author 
proposes to respect some principles of implementing decentralization. 
 





 The creation of modern, democratic and effective local/regional self-
government system is still one of the main issues of public administration 
reforms in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), although the basic legal and fi-
nancial basis for local self-governments was created in most of CEE countries 
(especially in all accession countries) very soon. 
 Already in 1990, in countries like Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slova-
kia the first local democratic elections were held. There was a set of new laws 
on local self-government, respecting basic criteria for this level of governance, as 
defined by the European Charter of Local Self-Government in following way: 
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“Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, 
within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of pub-
lic affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local popula-
tion. … The basic powers and responsibilities of local authorities shall be 
prescribed by the constitution or by statute. However, this provision shall not 
prevent the attribution to local authorities of powers and responsibilities for spe-
cific purposes in accordance with the law. … Local authorities shall, within the 
limits of the law, have full discretion to exercise their initiative with regard to any 
matter, which is not excluded from their competence nor assigned to any other 
authority”.  
 Other CEE countries, with some minor exceptions (like Ukraine, where 
local self- governments are still more formal than real force) followed similar 
patterns in later years, and as of today, the existence of local and in most cases 
also of regional self-government, allocated by many own responsibilities and also 
own resources is almost the rule in the region. 
 However, experience and especially outcomes show that not all positive 
expectations from decentralization and creation of local self-governing struc-
tures were fulfilled, on the contrary, region specific problems emerged. The 
paper highlights selected aspects of this issue.  
 
 
2. Decentralization – theoretical and  
practical issues 
2.1 Decentralization – basic theory 
“Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by 
those authorities, which are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility 
to another authority should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and 
requirements of efficiency and economy”.  
      European Charter of Local Self-Government 
 
As already mentioned, decentralization represents one of basic and al-
most universally used reform approaches. With some simplification it repre-
sents the transfer of powers, responsibilities and resources from central to 
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lover level, from the state administration to self-government on macro-level, 
but also changes in systems of management of organizational units producing 
public services on micro-level (in the paper, we will not consider this second 
dimension).  
Probably the most important issue behind decentralization is ”the sub-
sidiary” principle, clearly expressed by the European Charter of Local Self-
Government, quoted above. The principle of subsidiarity conveys that public 
administration should operate on the lowest possible level, to achieve opti-
mum quality. Closer to citizen it is expected that administrators and managers 
can better understand specific local needs and are able better to react to 
them. “Decentralization as the co-ordination mechanism for the public provi-
sion of goods and services represents an attempt to overcome information 
weaknesses involved in central co-ordination. When there is intergovernmen-
tal collaboration, then principals placed lower down know better how public 
programmes can be made to run efficiently” (Lane, 2000, p. 205). 
From the economic point of view, following “effectiveness” principle of 
the EU White Paper (European Commission, 2001): “Decentralization … is 
generally desirable from the viewpoint of efficiency and local accountability. 
These criteria must be balanced with other elements, such as spatial external-
ities, economies of scale, overall fiscal efficiency, regional equity, redistributive 
responsibilities of the government.” (Allen and Tommasi, 2001, pp. 73-74).  
From the point of view of other European good governance principles, 
decentralization has potential of positive impacts in more or less all govern-
ance dimensions. Especially openness and participation might be increased via 
effective decentralization, because of motivation, resulting from delegation of 
responsibilities and powers to lower level, closer to ”customers”, frequently 
level, where services are directly produced, and impacts better visible. How-
ever, such impacts might significantly decrease with the growing size of de-
centralized units (Westerwelt, H.W., 1994).  
Based on these facts, decentralization is generally accepted as the impor-
tant/main public administration reform in any country. However, it shall be 
stressed that decentralization is the tool with important potential, but also with 
some limitations. As there are not just positive reform mechanisms, also de-
centralization has to be introduced with respect to concrete reform environ-
ment, to avoid ”unexpected” negative consequences of its implementation. 
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Decentralization may for example increase direct and indirect costs. Eco-
nomic theories suggest that many public services are connected with decreas-
ing average costs with growing scale of their delivery, at least to some extent, 
because of better use of fixed assets (Stiglitz, 1989). Except of costs, decentraliza-
tion may be limited by insufficient local capacities - too small government units are 
expected to suffer from lack of competence and expertise, but also from lack 
of resources. “The administrative capacity of subnational governments, and 
the administrative and compliance costs of decentralization must be taken into 
the account when assigning expenditure among levels of government” (Allen 
and Tommasi, 2001, p. 74). 
Expected positive impacts of decentralization might be reversed also by 
so called transaction costs. Increased local activity means more voices, some-
times contradicting each other – it could be hardly expected that there is any 
government intervention with only positive impacts to all affected. To handle 
large scale of different interests is not simple, as well-known, ideal mecha-
nism of collective voting does not exist in reality (Bailey, 1999).  
With this, decentralization represents important, but to some extent con-
troversial tool of public administration reform also in standard conditions of 
functional democracy. However, additional risks and limits of decentralization 
in a specific environment of CEE accession countries shall not be forgotten - 
as indicated, during decentralization processes in CEE countries most of ne-
cessary new important formal structures were created, but for many reasons 
the public administration systems still do not function as expected. Impact and 
outcomes of reforms are in many cases not as anticipated, proving the fact 
that adoption of more or less effective ”western” reform tools into the transi-
tional environment is really complicated, and their non-careful implementation 
may lead to important problems (Coombes - Verheijen,1997), because of spe-
cific local environment. 
Decentralization and the principle of subsidiarity are very much based on 
the assumption that they would further revive local democracy and stipulate a 
higher level of participation of citizen in local issues. However, this relation is 
“both-sides” relation. Decentralization may help to create modern governance 
system, based on “White Paper” principles, but its implementation has to 
respect the level, to which principles of openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence have been already achieved, too.  
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Current “quality” of local democracy in CEE countries differs in many as-
pects from what is the reality in developed countries, and this fact shall be 
respected in the processes of decentralization and fiscal decentralization. Cen-
tral governments argue that they are not willing to transfer additional re-
sources to local authorities, because of macroeconomic consequences, but 
also because the local environment is not well developed to manage these 
resources. In the following chapters we provide some facts concerning this 
issue, using available data from selected CEE countries. 
2.2 Decentralization from practical point of view 
Decentralization in CEE region is based also on practical reasons. The 
most important of them is the EU public finance system. The Table 1 shows 
that large proportion of EU resources is used via structural and pre-accession 
funds, allocated mainly on regional principle. 
 
Table 1: EU expenditures 2005 and 2006 
 
Chapter 2006 2005 Change (%) 
1. Agriculture 50 991 020 000 48 464 850 000 + 5,21 
2. Structural expenditures 35 639 599 237 32 396 027 704 + 10,01 
3. Internal measures 8 889 218 143 8 016 662 269 + 10,88 
4. External measures   5 369 049 920 5 476 162 603 – 1,96 
5. Administration 6 656 369 817 6 292 367 368 + 5,78 
6. Reserves 458 000 000 446 000 000 + 2,69 
7. Pre-accession strategies 2 892 850 000 3 286 990 000 – 11,99 
8. Equalization 1 073 500 332 1 304 988 996 – 17,74 
Total 111 969 607 449 105 684 048 940 + 5,95 
Source: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/budget/data/D2006_VOL1/SK/nmc-grseq42960935830-
3/index.html 
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To become eligible to use structural funds any EU member state must 
draft its National Development Plan, based on thematic areas given by the 
European Commission (EC) and especially on own needs and priorities. Draft 
Plan is discussed with EC and after its approval national and regional bodies 
realize its implementation. The implementation is based on the NUTS system 
(„Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics“), including the following levels: 
1. NUTS 0,1 – the country 
2. NUTS 2 – regions with approximately 1-2 million inhabitants 
3. NUTS 3 – lover regional tier 
4. NUTS 4 – local units (micro regions) 
5. NUTS 5 – municipalities 
 
The existence of necessary effective regional structures, especially at 
NUTS 2 level is thus a pre-condition for the use of allocated funds. Regions 
shall be able to draft their regional development plans, decide on spending 
priorities; define programmes and select projects, constituted preferably in the 
form of self-governing units. 
2.3 Fiscal decentralization and its main problems 
Fiscal aspects represent a crucial part of the decentralisation process, as 
indicated also by the European Charter of Local Self-Government in following 
way: 
“Local authorities shall be entitled, within national economic policy, to 
adequate financial resources of their own, of which they may dispose freely 
within the framework of their powers”.  ... Local authorities' financial re-
sources shall be commensurate with the responsibilities provided for by the 
constitution and the law. Part at least of the financial resources of local au-
thorities shall derive from local taxes and charges of which, within the limits of 
statute, they have the power to determine the rate. ...  As far as possible, 
grants to local authorities shall not be earmarked for the financing of specific 
projects. The provision of grants shall not remove the basic freedom of local 
authorities to exercise policy discretion within their own jurisdiction”.  
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The definitions provided by the “Charter” highlight as minimum two im-
portant dimensions of the fiscal decentralisation, and raise also several issues, 
including those put bellow: 
1. The necessity to establish an effective link between the scale of res-
ponsibilities of the local authorities and their financial basis. 
2. The preference to finance local needs from local resources, and not by 
transfers (especially earmarked grants). 
3. To what extent the state administration has the right to set predefined 
standards for the delivery of local public services? 
 
Fiscal decentralization resource transfer 
The experience shows that it is much simpler to define responsibilities to 
be transferred from the state to self-government authorities, than to define the 
amount of resources to be transferred to local authorities to finance the provi-
sion of re-allocated responsibilities.  
According to our knowledge current systems of government budgeting 
and accounting in CEE do not allow to calculate full costs of provision of public 
services by the state (cash budgeting, economic classification of costs and 
non-accrual accounting methods are used, and changes to this have been in-
troduced only recently).  
As there are no adequate “service costs” data available, “negotiations” 
between local authorities and the state on the adequate amount of additional 
resources cannot be based on objective data, thus they become more or less 
political discussions, where more powerful partner wins. Risks of such proc-
esses, especially on the side of citizen, are tremendous. 
  
Increasing own sources of self-government 
The objective to finance local services from local resources and not by 
transfers from central budgets is to be respected, but it creates also certain 
additional problems. As the proportion of central government grants was still 
too high in many CEE countries in the end of the last century (Sevic, 2005), 
financial mechanisms shall change. With this at least four questions arise:   
A. How to design the best appropriate intergovernmental fiscal system 
that will guarantee needed local revenues, especially if it is impossible 
to predict exact real incomes from local taxes, fees and other sources 
of local authorities’ revenues? 
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B. What is the appropriate system of management of local taxation? 
C. Should we react to territorial disparities, created by fiscal decentralisa-
tion between regions and municipalities because of different tax base 
and different expenditure needs?  
D. Municipal borrowing and its regulation. 
 
 As for the first question – also in the case we would know the exact 
amount of resources that shall be re-allocated to local authorities, there is no 
way to adjust the fiscal system in the country to produce exactly what is ex-
pected. We have just to respect this, and incorporate this limitation into the 
decision-making procedures. 
 Concerning the second question, there is a comprehensive discussion on 
the issue of the system of collection of taxes. There is no doubt that cen-
tral/mass scale collection of taxes is more cost-effective. There are not enough 
reliable data on administrative and compliance costs of taxation from CEE condi-
tions, but we can provide one example of recent research to highlight the problem. 
Administrative costs of local taxation in the Czech Republic were calcu-
lated by Vitek and Pubal (2002) on the example of random sample of several 
municipalities, using methods of personal interviews, personal time-shots and 
analysis of existing statistical data. The Table 2 shows the results. 
 








 (in 1000 CZK) 
Administrative 
costs  
(in 1000 CZK) 
Administrative 
costs (%) 
A 150 3 6 200 
B 400 7,5 8,1 107,5 
C 6400 1313 182 13,9 
D 9800 970 307 31,6 
E 23000 1365 243 17,8 
F 33100 7750 243 3,13 
G 72000 15207 486 3,2 
Source: Vitek and Pubal, 2002 
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 Although the data have been obtained from just random sample with a 
small number of municipalities, and the calculation might be biased by prob-
lems to calculate exact costs (like estimate of proportion of time of some offi-
cials, devoted to this issue), figures clearly present the problem of relatively 
high administrative costs for any activity in too small municipalities (administra-
tive costs of central taxation in the Czech Republic are estimated to be a bit 
less than 3%).  
 Concerning the third question more answers/solutions are available. Rep-
resentatives of “right wing” theories would call for “voting by foot” (Hamer-
nikova and Kubatova, 2005), but such “solutions” are not accepted in the sys-
tem of European values. The Charter of European Local Self-Government pro-
vides its opinion to this in the following way: 
“The protection of financially weaker local authorities calls for the institu-
tion of financial equalisation procedures or equivalent measures, which are 
designed to correct the effects of the unequal distribution of potential sources 
of finance and of the financial burden they must support. Such procedures or 
measures shall not diminish the discretion local authorities may exercise 
within their own sphere of responsibility. Local authorities shall be consulted, 
in an appropriate manner, on the way in which redistributed resources are to 
be allocated to them”. 
Equalisation on the base of different tax base and different expenditure 
needs is a standard tool in developed countries; however, effective equalisa-
tions systems have not been designed and approved in almost any of CEE 
countries, yet.  
The last issue we discuss in this part is municipal borrowing. The “Euro-
pean Charter of Local Self-Government” provides following:  
“For the purpose of borrowing for capital investment, local authorities 
shall have access to the national capital market within the limits of the law”.  
The real situation in CEE countries in the area of municipal borrowing is 
different. At the start in several countries originally there were no restrictions 
concerning the level and structure of external resources to be used to finance 
municipal financial needs. As the result, several municipalities accepted too 
high level of credits, and used borrowing to finance non-capital expenditures 
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(in the Czech Republic the municipality Rokytnice bankrupted in late nineties). 
As the reaction, central governments set tighter budgetary rules.  
However, according to Aristovnik and Bercic (2006) the sustainability of 
local finance in CEE region is relatively high and only Slovenia and Hungary  
face limited problems from this point of view. In countries with developed and 
health banking sector the risk of “over-borrowing” almost disappears.  
 
Public service standards 
As indicated by our question, transfer of responsibilities from the state, 
organized together with transfer of resources might be connected also with 
the issue of standards of public services. The issue of standards has more 
dimensions, and we want to touch on two of them: 
• standards, defining the structure and scale of public services to 
be delivered (service standards), 
• standards, defining the quality of public services to be delivered 
(quality standards). 
 
Concerning the first group, it was for example the Czech Republic that al-
ready prepared the system of standards defining the structure and scale of 
certain public services, as they shall be delivered by local authorities. There is 
a very different opinion on this, and many experts feel that such approach 
undermines the principle of local responsibility. The main arguments behind 
such approach are insufficient information and paternalism (Stiglitz, 1989). 
Quality standards are much better accepted, and our feeling is that the 
system of “Citizen Charters”, to provide consumers with criteria to be able to 
assess what quality they got for their money, shall be further developed in 
CEE region. 
According to our opinion, the central government should focus not so 
much on service standards (especially in more developed countries), but in-
stead of this it shall promote regular benchmarking and performance audit 
procedures (decision if to prefer benchmarking or more difficult performance 
audit shall be case by case decision, depending on the character of a service), 
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3. Decentralization trends in CEE: selected  
evidence 
 
 Processes of decentralization and development of local and regional self-
governments are characterized by large time and scale differences amoung 
transitional countries in CEE. Some countries enacted a relatively comprehen-
sive package of decentralization measures already in the first half of nineties 
(Hungary, Poland). Other countries started with the second phase of decen-
tralization much later (for example Slovakia and the Czech Republic in late 
nineties), and there are countries where massive decentralization started only 
recently (Macedonia) or is only starting now (Ukraine).  
 The willingness to decentralize and the scale and timing of decentraliza-
tion in selected countries are to some extend demonstrated by the Table 3 
showing the formal willingness of CEE countries to decentralize.  
 As obvious, all CEE countries promised to create real local self-
governments; however the real level of respecting all signed principles still 
differs (seems that the most “out of date” country is Ukraine, where elected 
local governments do not have any own funds). 
The scale of responsibilities delegated to municipalities differs signifi-
cantly between CEE countries and the amount of own resources of elected 
local units is lower than in “old” EU member states: “Local public government 
finance decentralization and building the capacity for local revenue rising abili-
ties of local/regional self-governments reforms have been lagging behind all 
other reforms in CEE countries” (Sevic, 2005, p. 17). In most CEE countries 
the share of municipal expenditures in total public expenditures is between 10 
and 20% and in some even bellow 10 %. Intergovernmental transfers are still 
the dominant or a very important resource source (Sevic, 2005). This situation 
improves very slowly, even in some countries the trend is reverse – for exam-
ple in Hungary the share of local governments expenditures in GDP decreased 
from 16,5 % in 1993 to 12,8 % in 2000. 
 Due to many factors the size of local self-governments in CEE is highly 
fragmented, and in some countries there are hundreds or thousands of (too) 
small municipalities (we will come to this issue also later). Davey (2002, p. 36) 
comments to this: “Failure to drive a solution … (to territorial fragmentation) 
… often leaves in the hands of local state administration functions that should 
be managed by locally accountable bodies”. 
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Table 3: European Charter of Local Self-Government: Signatures,  
Ratification, and Implementation in CEE Countries 
 
Member State of the 
Council of Europe 
Date of signature Date of ratification 
Date of entry into 
force 
Albania 27. 05. 1998 04. 04. 2000 01. 08. 2000 
Armenia 11. 05. 2001 25. 01. 2002 01. 05. 2002 
Azerbaijan 21. 12. 2001 15. 04. 2002 01. 08. 2002 
BiH 12. 07. 2002 12. 07. 2002 01. 11. 2002 
Bulgaria 03. 10. 1994 10. 05. 1995 01. 09. 1995 
Croatia 11. 10. 1997 11. 10. 1997 01. 02. 1998 
Czech Republic 28. 05. 1998 07. 05. 1999 01. 09. 1999 
Estonia 04. 11. 1993 16. 12. 1994 01. 04. 1995 
Georgia 29. 05. 2002 01. 12. 2004 01. 04. 2005 
Hungary 06. 02. 1992 21. 03. 1994 01. 07. 1994 
Latvia 05. 12. 1996 05. 12. 1996 01. 04. 1997 
Lithuania 27. 11. 1996 22. 06. 1999 01. 10. 1999 
Moldova  02. 05. 1996 02. 10. 1997 01. 02. 1998 
Poland  19. 02. 1993 22. 11. 1993 01. 03. 1994 
Romania 04. 10. 1994 28. 01. 1998 01. 05. 1998 
Russia 28. 02. 1996 05. 05. 1998 01. 09. 1998 
Serbia 24. 06. 2005 - - 
Slovakia 23. 02. 1999 01. 02. 2000 01. 06. 2000 
Slovenia 11. 10. 1994 15. 11. 1996 01. 03. 1997 
Macedonia 14. 06. 1996 06. 06. 1997 01. 10. 1997 
Ukraine 06. 11. 1996 11. 09. 1997 01. 01. 1998 
Source: www.conventions.coe.int 
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Regional self-government 
On regional level the situation is more complicated. In spite NUTS 2 level 
is necessary for spending of EU finds, few countries created respective 
elected structures. In some CEE countries regional self-government units do 
not exist (even in EU member states, like Bulgaria, where six regions were 
created in 1999 as administrative and not real self-government units). This 
situation is connected also to unclear EU policy in this area.  
The Draft European Charter on Regional Democracy was initiated by the 
Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe 
(CLRAE) in 1997. The original idea behind the Charter was to set out the key 
principles that should underlie effective regional democracy in Europe, cover-
ing areas such as financial autonomy and legislative powers. However, the 
Charter failed to attract the support of a sufficient majority of Member States 
at the Ministerial Conferences in Helsinki in 2002 and Budapest in 2005, with 
disagreements emerging over whether the instrument should be legally bind-
ing.  
Additionally, in some countries, where regional self-government units 
were created, their territories are large enough to fulfil criteria for NUTS 2 (Slo-
vakia, Czech Republic), causing increased transactions costs of management 
of EU funds and complicating execution of other responsibilities. Although this 
problem has already been well known and named, for example Slovenia wants 
to do the same as a part of the territorial structure reform package currently in 
discussion – as clear example of limited capacity of CEE states to learn on 
mistakes already done by others and to utilize positive reform outcomes from 
abroad.  
 
4. Decentralization and the local democracy 
 
 The relation between decentralization and the local democracy is a two 
dimensional issue. Effective local democracy represents an important precon-
dition for successful decentralization, and successful decentralization supports 
development of local democracy. In the following part we highlight some as-
pects of those relations.  
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Are citizens prepared for local democracy (participation)? 
According to our opinion citizens in transitional countries are still not well 
prepared to execute effective control over politicians and bureaucrats (neither 
on central, nor on local level) – after the long period of former regime no sur-
prise. There is some evidence to support this argument, but also to show that 
situation is improving in some dimensions. Many, especially older people, still 
think that the state “donates them its services” and they must be satisfied 
with any quality provided (for example in Slovakia almost 40 % of citizen pre-
ferred the state to the market in 2005).  
 The ability to control the state via complaints (or even via courts – in Ma-
cedonia there is still only one case of a suiting the government for malfunc-
tions) and by effective participation is also limited. Several surveys provide 
data (and it seems show some, but limited, improvements). For example (Swi-
aniewicz 2001, p. 66) citizen’s willingness to participate in public activities in 
the Czech Republic in 1995 was as follows: 
• certainly yes: 11% 
• generally yes: 22% 
• not yes, not no: 22% 
• generally no: 26% 
• certainly no: 12% 
 
The LGS (Soos and Zentai, 2005, p. 175) collected data on different forms 
of political participation, including following five areas – attendance at public 
demonstrations, petitions, direct meetings with local officials, challenges to 
local decisions and proposal writing. According to this research, the most fre-
quent case, drafting or sharing of proposals connected with local affairs, is 
becoming more and more frequent (especially in Poland and Hungary).  
According to Soos and Zentai (2005) the direct role of interested citizens, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and local businesses is seen as much 
less important than the role of actors with a formal position within the gov-
ernment structure. These community actors seem to be the least important in 
Bulgaria—the observation is true first of all in the case of NGOs, but it applies 
to interested citizens as well. Bulgaria is also the only country in which the role 
of businesses is assessed as higher than that of interested residents. It is also 
the only one in which the role of NGOs is seen as negligible. Data about 
participation in local elections are also not very optimistic, significantly bellow 
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50 % and decreasing (see for example Soos and Zentai, 2005). Especially re-
gional self-government elections do not attract citizens to participate (Slovakia 
2006 turn-out was about 15%). 
 
What are the attitudes of elected local politicians? 
For the position and attitudes of local politicians the answers of local may-
ors to questions of LDI survey in 1997 are symptomatic (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Goals of Local Government  
 
 Czech Republic Poland Slovakia 
Democracy 61,3 54,3 71,7 
Autonomy 67,5 61,5 89,1 
Effectiveness 71,2 84,2 49,2 
Source: Swianiewicz, P., 2001, p. 24 
 
 
Data provided show that the right for independent decision making is still 
the most important for local politicians, in many cases serving to small interest 
groups and not to total population (in Czech Republic 35%, in Poland 48%, in 
Hungary 42% of respondents think that local mayors serve only to small part 
of inhabitants and to small interest groups (Swianiewicz, 2001, p. 25). Because 
all the provided figures are biased (mayors not willing to present real prefer-
ences, citizen due to lack of understanding the modern governance) the real 
situation seems to be quite unsatisfactory. 
 
Citizen trust to self-governments 
The trust of citizen to local governments is still limited, but much higher 
that to national level structures (Table 5).  
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Table 5: Level of trust of citizen to different institutions in Slovakia 
(SR) and the Czech Republic (CR) 
 
 1995 1998 2000 
 SR CR SR CR SR CR 
Local self-governments 51 57 50 50 53 60 
National council 30 23 32 18 24 22 
Central government 32 55 33 42 32 30 
Source: Swianiewicz, ed., 2001, pp. 56, 231 
 
 
According to Soos and Zentai (2005) the situation is similar, from selected 
countries only Bulgaria shows a high level of distrust to regions (however, 
regions are administrative and not self-government unit in Bulgaria). The most 
trusted democratic institution is frequently the presidency (49.2% in Estonia, 
38.7% in Poland, and 40.2% in Bulgaria). The central government is greatly 
distrusted in most countries, the least trusted institutions are the political par-
ties (distrusted by 30.1% in Estonia and 53.4% in Poland), followed by parlia-
ment (40.8% in Poland and 37.3% in Bulgaria). Municipal self-governments are 
in between.  
 
Accountability and responsibility 
 Accountability and responsibility are partly different issues, but very much 
inter-linked, therefore we shall deal with them in one bulk, showing that still 
no level of government in accession countries really respects its role to serve 
and to account to its stake-holders: especially to citizen. Several examples and 
data can support this argument.  
 In CEE local self-governments in many cases still try to avoid most of al-
ternative forms of accountability. Davey (2002, p. 39) comments on this: “The 
greater degree of fiscal decentralisation the greater need for improved sys-
tems of accountability. EU accession processes, for example, highlight the 
need to develop systems of external audit of local government and to restrict 
indebtedness, measures that are both unpopular and technically demanding”. 
Compared to central level, step by step improving in reporting to citizen, 
local authorities still do not fully accept the necessity to be accountable to local 
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citizen, and some existing initiatives are more or less formal. There is for ex-
ample general trend to publish yearly performance reports of public organisa-
tions available to citizen that answer many important performance related 
questions, like the use of resources, goals and their fulfilment, possible im-
provements. Municipalities in several CEE countries do not follow this positive 
trend as a rule. Especially economic performance data are still not the data to 
be shared with citizen. On the other hand web pages, especially pages of lar-
ger cities are significantly improving (author’s experience, but also for example 
Spacek, 2006, Kunstelj, Leben and Vintar, 2006, Aadel, 2006), are also more 
and more serving to accountability principle. 
Legal accountability improves too slowly. In Poland corruption started to 
be really prosecuted from very late nineties, in Slovakia the first lord-mayor 
was imprisoned for corruption only in 2006 (not because there is no corrup-
tion). Accountability and responsibility are still not values - as clearly visible 
from the statement of the director of one hospital in Slovakia, caught for large 
inefficiencies in procurement:  
“The life of the patient is much more important than the Public Procure-
ment Law. Our only concern is to provide the patient with maximum care”. 
The patient does not care about the procurement of medicaments; he just 
wants his/her drug” (Správy STV, 3. 11. 2004).  
 
Transparency and corruption 
 Mixed experience with some major preconditions of functional decentral-
ised local governance continues also when investigating level of transparency. 
No surprise – increased transparency limits possibilities for exercising private 
(non-ethical) benefits from serving in public positions, still common practice in 
all accession countries. CEE countries still belong to the most corrupted states 
in the world, at least according to Transparency International corruption per-
ception indexes (Table 6). 
 The problems of corruption and its sources in selected CEE countries 
were deeply investigated by Miller, Grodeland and Koschechkina (1998), bring-
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Country 2005 CPI Score 
1 Island 9.7 
2 Finland 9.6 
27 Estonia 6.4 
31 Slovenia 6.1 
40 Hungary 5.0 
44 Lithuania 4.8 
47 Czechia 4.3 
47 Slovakia 4.3 
51 Latvia 4.2 
55 Bulgaria 4.0 
70 Croatia 3.4 
70 Poland 3.4 
85 Romania 3.0 
107 Ukraine 2.6 
128 Russia 2.4 
* 2005 CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business peo-
ple, academics and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly cor-
rupt). Source: www.transparency.sk 
 
 The Table 7 indicates that politicians and officials might behave as rent 
seekers not responsible for promoting national and local interests.  
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Slovakia Bulgaria Ukraine 
Most politicians behave  
worse now 
65% 82% 40% 87% 
Most officials behave  
worse now 
47% 66% 45% 89% 
Source: Miller, Grodeland and Koschechkina (1998) 
 
 People seeking something to which they were entitled by law, still feel 
that they have to offer money or other benefits, to get the service of expected 
quality. Table 8 highlights this problem. 
 
 
Table 8: Likelihood that bribes must be offered to different officials 
 
 Czech Republic Slovakia Bulgaria Ukraine 
Officials in state ministries 70% 85% 82% 87% 
Hospital doctors 47% 89% 93% 94% 
Customs officials 53% 71% 92% 86% 
Court officials 44% 75% 80% 87% 
MPs 54% 74% 74% 80% 
University staff 34% 78% 73% 89% 
Officials in local government 
offices 
49% 58% 79% 87% 
Police officers 42% 64% 72% 89% 
Elected officials on local councils 44% 52% 69% 80% 
People working in the private 
sector 
42% 55% 63% 61% 
School teachers 10% 36% 45% 68% 
Source: Miller, Grodeland and Koschechkina (1998) 
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Data provided by Miller, Grodeland and Koschechkina may be seen as 
outdated, but also current pools and researches do not show major improve-
ments (see for example www.transparency.org and national TI pages).  
To increase transparency almost all CEE countries recently adopted mod-
ern laws on free access to information, however the experiences of compli-
ance with this law on local level are not fully satisfactory. Administrative, 
financial and time constraints are used to prevent citizen to access ”free” 
information. E-governance is another tool, serving also for better transparency. 
The example from one of the most “e-developed” country – Slovenia (Kun-
stelj, Leben and Vintar, 2006) shows that the importance of e-governance also 
on local level grows, but improvements are still necessary: 
“The results of the supply-side survey show that most administrative bod-
ies are presented on the web with information about their organization and 
operation. They also offer e-mail communication with citizens. Much 
downloadable application forms are already available for the procedures in the 
competence of central government bodies, contrary to the local self-
government procedures. Regarding the distribution between central and local 
government of available e-applications, a similar conclusion can be made but 
the amount of the e-applications is considerably smaller. E-transactions have 
not been implemented yet. 
On the demand side the survey results show that awareness of e-
government among internet users is surprisingly high, as all of them are aware 
of at least one functional group of e-government (information, e-mail commu-
nication with civil servants, downloadable application forms and public e-
services). At first glance, the level of e-government usage is also relatively 
high, as 83% of internet users have already used at least one of the above-
mentioned possibilities; however, only a small amount of the provided infor-
mation, application forms and e-services has already been used. The same is 
also true of e-mail communication.”  
To conclude, we have to stress that probably in all accession countries 
lack of transparency represents one of main weaknesses, prohibiting to 
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5. Decentralization and the local efficiency:  
general problems and selected example 
 
 Good governance has to be effective, efficient and economical. The rela-
tions between decentralization and efficiency of local public administration are 
very difficult to assess, especially in specific conditions of transitional envi-
ronment, with very limited database of necessary data. In the following text 
we first highlight two important problems limiting the economic success of 
decentralization. Then we present some examples of local inefficiencies, as 
warning cases. 
5.1 Costs of decentralization process 
 All reforms, including decentralization, are always connected with costs 
that are usually underestimated (for example estimated costs of public admini-
stration reform in Slovakia realized in 1996 were 20 billion Sk, a bit less than 
10% of total yearly state budget expenditures, compared to official planned 
figure on the level close to 3 billion Sk). It is not so simple to find such amount 
of resources in accession countries, but without them many necessary pre-
conditions for successful decentralization cannot be achieved. Too high “re-
form realization” costs (direct and indirect) may also overweight future 
benefits and limit real success of the reform. To cope with this problem some 
developed (and also CEE) countries established “deregulation agencies”, re-
sponsible for “ex-ante audit” type of assessment of any government action, 
able to prevent “unnecessary reforms”. However, such approach – real ex-
ante audit of full costs and benefits of decisions (impact assessment) has not 
been effectively implemented in CEE countries, with Slovenia as one of the 
few examples of positive practice. 
5.2 Economies of scale 
As already indicated, there are important economic and management lim-
its to decentralise several public services and activities. Because of “scale-
economics” dimension (decreasing unit costs with increasing scale of production), 
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stressed also by the European Charter of Local Self-Government, it is more 
effective to produce certain services in larger volumes, in order to decrease 
unit costs and to deliver effective quality. Nevertheless, the processes of de-
centralisation and of fiscal decentralisation are very negatively influenced by 
territorial fragmentation, and limited willingness for amalgamation or voluntary 
inter-municipal co-operation. 
 Problems concerning territorial structure appear in most countries at least 
of one level of self-government (local and/or regional), as we have already 
mentioned in the above text. In former regime also very small settlements 
were allowed to become autonomous legal units (municipality). After 1989 
only few countries, like Bulgaria or Poland, were able to create larger units of 
local-self government, but other, especially the Czech Republic or Slovakia 
maintained fragmented territorial structure with large number of really small 
scale local authorities (curiously, in both countries the number of municipalities 
increased after 1990 as the outcome of additional separation processes). The 
problem of the size of municipalities is presented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Average size of municipalities in selected CEE countries 
 
Country 
% of municipalities 




Average area of 
municipality (sqm) 
Bulgaria 0 35 000 432 
Poland 0 16 000 130 
Hungary  54 3 300 32 
Slovakia 68 1 900 17 
Czech Republic 80 1 700 13 
Source: Davey, 2002, p. 36 
 
 As apparent from respective data many “CEE countries have thousands 
of communities with municipal status with population bellow 1000 (and 
a substantial proportion of these fewer than 200). Reform programs are 
challenged by the inability of such communities to provide administrative 
Juraj Nemec 
 Decentralization reforms and their relations to local  
democracy and efficiency: CEE lessons 
Uprava, letnik V, 3/2007 29 
and financial capacity, and the scale economics and catchment areas neces-
sary for essential services” (Davey, 2002, p. 35). 
 The problem of fragmentation could be solved by voluntary co-operation, 
or by contracting, but such mechanisms are still in very early stage of their 
development in all CEE countries. 
 
5.3  Local inefficiencies – contracting for local public 
services in Czechia and Slovakia 
Contracting is a frequent form of delivery of local services. The Table 10 
compares the scale of contracting-out in Slovakia and Czech Republic and its 
development trends.  
 
Table 10: Scale of external forms (contracting out) of delivery of se-
lected local public services in Slovak and Czech municipalities (%) 
 
Slovak Republic Czech Republic 
Service 
2001 2005 2006 TI 2001 2005 TI 
Waste 49 64 69 71 80 
Cemeteries 27 12 16 42 26 
Public green 16 18 33 45 24 
Communications 21 41 45 31 38 
Public lighting 30 35 40 23 60 
Source: original research based on the data obtained from selected municipalities related to 
the local service delivery and in 2001 and 2005 and data gathered from results of research 
projects of Transparency International Slovakia and Czechia (TI). 
 
According to the data collected external delivery of local public services 
(excepting maintenance of public lighting infrastructure) was used in medium 
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scale in Slovakia already in 2001, and was even more frequent in Czechia. The 
scale of contracting-out selected local public services by municipalities (ex-
cepting management of cemeteries in both countries and public green main-
tenance in Czechia) has increased apparently in the last period. The data 
clearly indicate that external delivery of local public services is a very frequent 
solution both in Slovakia and Czechia. 
In theory, the decision to contract (to achieve the “best value”) shall be 
based on careful analysis of all available choices, especially on the systematic 
assessment of existing alternatives (ex-ante audit). The selection of external 
supplier shall also respect relevant legislative norms (Medved’, Mericková, 
Nemec, 2004).  
However, the ex-ante analysis of the most appropriate form of delivery is 
not effectively realized in Czech or Slovak municipalities - if nothing else, mu-
nicipalities do not have data on real costs, allowing comparing. Also, although 
both countries are already EU members and should respect EU directives and 
not only national procurement laws, the process of contracting is in most 
cases non-transparent. The Table 11 presents data on methods of contracting-
out of selected local public services used by the analyzed municipalities.  
 





public Procurement method used 
2001 2005 2006 TI 2005 
Open procedure 16 17 27 12 
Restricted procedure 5 0 5 40 
Negotiated procedure 0 13 30 - 
Price bid 0 0 0 - 
Direct purchase 31 17 38 48 
Municipality was not willing to  
provide information 
48 55 - - 
Source: Original research based on the data obtained from selected municipalities related to 
the local service delivery and in 2001 and 2005 and data gathered from results of research 
projects of Transparency International Slovakia and Czechia. 
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Several problems are evident from the table. Many municipalities in Slo-
vakia were not willing to provide information about the procurement method 
used, although they were to do this (the law on free access to information). 
The „willingness of municipalities to provide information“ was not a problem 
in samples collected by the Transparency International, because of the 
“power” of this body and its capacity to invest more resources to the direct 
questioning. In both countries the practice in selecting an appropriate pro-
curement method is inappropriate. Open tendering is relatively rare, direct 
purchase, including the negotiated procedure too frequent. Such situation is 
alarming; in most cases municipalities do not respect public procurement law. 
There is no really significant improvement in this area.   
Concerning efficiency the unit costs are the simplest benchmark of the 
efficiency in service delivery. However, to be able to understand the data ob-
tained, we should take into account several factors determining the complexity 
and character of the data: 
1. In some cases we cannot calculate the unit costs. The reason is that, 
the service extent can be hardly quantified and the unification of service 
delivery does not exist. There are no official standards of the local public 
services delivery, we can only assume that the level of quantity and qual-
ity of service in different municipalities of the same size group is similar.  
2. Another problem is that there is no complexity in monitoring this meas-
ure by the local self-government. There is no accrual accountancy at the 
level of local self-government and no possibility to find the real cost 
value of service delivery1.  
 
 The results of our efficiency benchmark are presented by the Table 12, 
comparing unit costs of internal delivery with contracted services. 
 
                                                 
1 In case of internal service delivery the accounted service costs are mostly lower than the 
real costs of service delivery and it contains only the direct costs, because there is no accrual 
accountancy at the local self-government level in Slovakia. We can consider the data of the 
costs service delivery realised by the municipal employees, gross – budgetary and net-
budgetary organisation of municipality as disvalued.  
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2001 2005 2006 TI 2005 
Waste 94 94 125 137 
Cemeteries 64 13 67 95 
Public parks 82 192 150 86 
Communications 70 109 119 142 
Public lighting 100 138 128 118 
Source: Original research based on the data obtained from selected municipalities related to 
the local service delivery in 2001 and 2005 and data gathered from results of research pro-
jects of Transparency International Slovakia and Czechia. 
 
The data presented in Table 12 show very different benchmarking results. 
Contracting out public services in Slovakia is apparently more cost-intensive 
than internal delivery of public services in 7 cases, where the index is above 
120 %. The data show clearly higher cost-efficiency only in 5 (one third) cases. 
There might be several reasons of this result and we cannot decide for just 
one of them: 
1. Inaccuracy in calculating the real cost of service delivery by the local 
self-government. As indicated, because there is no accrual accoun-
tancy at the level of local self-government and thus no possibility to 
measure the real costs of service delivery, internal delivery costs are 
underestimated. This means that in cases where the index for external 
delivery is bellow 120%, contracting should be cost effective. How-
ever, recent experience from last Transparency International Slovakia 
sample clearly indicates that data provided by municipalities are in 
some cases (cemeteries in Slovakia in 2005) unreliable.  
2. Insufficient supply of public services produced by private sector in ter-
ritory of municipality or monopoly position of private producer of public 
service – it creates a situation where inappropriate price for service 
production is charged by the private partner.  
Juraj Nemec 
 Decentralization reforms and their relations to local  
democracy and efficiency: CEE lessons 
Uprava, letnik V, 3/2007 33 
3. Different local characteristics, different citizen’s requirements for services. 
4. Higher quality standard of contracted local public services obtaining is 
cost-intensive. 
5. Inappropriate decision-making process in service delivery arrangement 
selection and large possibilities for corruption in external service producer 




 Most if not all experts would agree that decentralisation is important, 
maybe the most important tool of public administration reform, but also that it 
does not represent unique ”all treating” medicine. Decentralisation has the 
same character as most of other reform mechanisms – it can bring both posi-
tive and negative effects, depending on local conditions, environment and 
connected complementary measures. In inappropriate environment, or be-
cause of implementation failures, decentralisation cannot deliver expected 
positive improvements as a rule. The opposite might be expected – especially 
in short term perspective, the decentralisation, not supported by other mecha-
nisms, might deepen many existing problems, opening additional space for 
many forms of ”government failure”. 
Because of the mentioned facts, the formal introduction of local and re-
gional self-government is only the one of the first steps to the real decentrali-
zation of the state, and on the way to modern governance, based on 
principles, explained for example by the “White Paper” (European Commis-
sion, 2001) defining main values of modern governance as openness, partici-
pation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. 
In CEE environment, decentralization and fiscal decentralization should be 
implemented very carefully, and as the complex process. Formal transfer of 
responsibilities and resources might be not enough to achieve positive out-
comes and impacts, especially not in short-term dimension. Without imple-
mentation of necessary complementary measures, fiscal decentralization may 
just represent the transfer of public funds from hands of central bureaucrats to 
hands of local politicians and bureaucrats, serving their private interests, and 
not citizens as original “owners” of the resources. Such risk is still very high in 
the specific environment of CEE countries, where local democracy is still de-
veloping, and main values of modern governance, like openness, participation, 
Juraj Nemec 
Decentralization reforms and their relations to local  
democracy and efficiency: CEE lessons 
Uprava, letnik V, 3/2007 34 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence do not dominate on any public 
administration level. For reform success, this fact is to be respected, and 
should respect at least following principles: 
1. Decentralization shall be understood as a tool and not as the definite 
goal. 
2. Decentralization is not a simple and one-dimensional strategy, and its 
outcomes and impacts will differ according to concrete time and envi-
ronment. 
3. To decentralize, opportunity, capacity and preparedness are needed. 
4. Decentralization strategies have to take account of all the main in-
volved elements - especially legal, financial, territorial and ownership 
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POVZETEK 
DECENTRALIZACIJSKE REFORME IN NJIHOVA 
RAZMERJA DO LOKALNE DEMOKRACIJE IN 
U^INKOVITOSTI: LEKCIJE IZ DRŽAV SREDNJE IN 
VZHODNE EVROPE 
 
Prispevek obravnava uvajanje decentralizacije v državah Srednje in 
Vzhodne Evrope po podpisu in ratifikaciji Evropske listine lokalne samo-
uprave. Nastanek sodobnega in u~inkovitega lokalnega ali regionalnega 
sistema samouprave je na tem podro~ju {e vedno ena od glavnih tem re-
form javne uprave, ~eprav so bili osnovni in finan~ni pogoji za lokalno 
samoupravo ustvarjeni že zelo zgodaj. Izku{nje in rezultati kažejo, da niso bila 
izpolnjena vsa pozitivna pri~akovanja, ki naj bi jih prinesla decentralizacija in 
nastanek lokalne samouprave. Nasprotno, pojavili so se specifi~ni problemi, 
ki se nana{ajo na posamezne regije. Verjetno najpomembnej{e vpra{anje, 
povezano z decentralizacijo, je na~elo subsidiarnosti, ki je jasno izraženo v 
Evropski listini lokalne samouprave. Javne naloge naj po možnosti izvajajo 
tiste oblasti, ki so državljanom najbližje. Pri~akovati je, da lahko naloge, ki so 
bližje državljanom, upravljavci bolje razumejo, zaradi ~esar se lahko tudi 
bolje odzivajo na posebne lokalne potrebe. Z u~inkovitostjo decentralizacije 
se lahko pove~ata tudi preglednost in participacija. Vzrok je predvsem v mo-
tivaciji, ki izvira iz delegiranja pristojnosti na nižji nivo, ki je bližje "strankam". 
Decentralizacija lahko pripomore k nastanku sodobnega sistema upravljanja, 
vendar mora njeno uvajanje spo{tovati tudi raven, do katere so bila na~ela 
odprtosti, participacije, odgovornosti, u~inkovitosti in soodvisnosti že 
dosežena. Prenos pooblastil z državne ravni s prenosom sredstev je povezan 
tudi z zagotavljanjem standardov javnih storitev (standardi pri zagotavljanju 
storitev in standardi zagotavljanja kakovosti).  
Vse države podpisnice so se obvezale, da bodo ustvarile lokalno samo-
upravo. Kljub temu se v resnici vsa na~ela zelo razli~no spo{tujejo. Stopnja 
pooblastil, ki so bila prenesena na ob~ine, se zelo razlikuje med državami, 
nižja so tudi lastna sredstva v primerjavi s "starimi" državami ~lanicami EU. 
Državni transferji so {e vedno prevladujo~ ali zelo pomemben vir zago-
tavljanja sredstev. Kljub pozitivnim rezultatom mora biti decentralizacija 
vpeljana glede na konkretno okolje, da bi se lahko izognili nepri~akovanim 
negativnim posledicam. U~inkovita demokracija na lokalni ravni je 
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pomemben predpogoj za uspe{no decentralizacijo, le-ta pa obratno podpira 
razvoj lokalne demokracije.  
Kljub tem ugotovitvam po mnenju avtorja državljani v tranzicijskih 
državah {e vedno niso dobro pripravljeni za izvr{evanje u~inkovite kontrole 
nad politiki in uradniki, kar po dolgem obdobju biv{ih režimov ni veliko pre-
sene~enje. V ve~ primerih se pravica do neodvisnega odlo~anja uporablja v 
prid majhnim interesnim skupinam in ne celotni populaciji. Dejansko stanje 
ni zadovoljivo, saj župani niso pripravljeni predstavljati dejanskih prednosti, 
ki jih prina{a sodobno upravljanje, medtem ko državljanom primanjkuje ra-
zumevanje sodobnega upravljanja. Zaupanje državljanov do lokalnih oblasti 
je {e vedno majhno, ~eprav je {e vedno veliko ve~je kot do državnih oblast-
nih struktur. V pristopnih državah nobena raven lokalne samouprave 
resni~no {e ne spo{tuje svoje vloge do prebivalcev, pravna odgovornost se 
le po~asi izbolj{uje; za te države {e vedno velja, da so najbolj skorumpirane 
na celom svetu. V vseh pristopnih državah ~lanicah je verjetno pomanjkanje 
odprtosti ena najve~jih slabosti, ki prepre~uje doseganje splo{no sprejetih 
standardov lokalne samouprave in uspe{ne fiskalne decentralizacije.  
Negativne posledice decentralizacije se nana{ajo na alokacijo finan~nih 
sredstev, optimalizacijo teritorialne strukture in {ibkost lokalne demokracije. 
Enote lokalne uprave, {e posebno majhne, niso stro{kovno u~inkovite niti v 
upravljanju niti v kakovosti, kakor tudi ne v porabi javnih sredstev. Da bi re-
forme uresni~ile na~rtovano demokracijo in u~inkovitost, bi bilo pri uvajanju 
decentralizacije treba upo{tevati nekatera na~ela. Vse reforme, tako tudi de-
centralizacija, so vedno povezane s stro{ki, ki so navadno podcenjeni, preve-
liki stro{ki realizacije pa lahko presegajo prihodnje koristi in omejijo dejanski 
uspeh reform. U~inki decentralizacije se lahko drasti~no zmanj{ajo z 
nara{~ajo~im {tevilom decentraliziranih enot. Veliko držav ima skupnosti s 
statusom ob~ine, v katerih je populacija pod 1 000 prebivalcev (znaten del od 
teh ima manj kot 200 prebivalcev). Reforme so zaradi tega vpra{ljive, saj take 
skupnosti ne morejo zagotavljati ustreznih administrativnih in finan~nih spo-
sobnosti. Problem razdrobljenosti se lahko re{i s prostovoljnim sodelovan-
jem ali pogodbenim sodelovanjem, vendar so ti mehanizmi v {e zelo zgodnji 
fazi.  
Ve~ina strokovnjakov se strinja, da je decentralizacija pomembno, ver-
jetno eno najpomembnej{ih orodij reform javne uprave, vendar nikakor ne 
pomeni unikatnega zdravila, ki bi delovalo v vseh primerih. Decentralizacija 
ima enake zna~ilnosti kot ve~ina drugih reformnih mehanizmov – lahko 
privede do pozitivnih in negativnih u~inkov, ki so odvisni od lokalnih 
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pogojev, okolja in spremljajo~ih razmerij. V neprimernem okolju ali zaradi 
napak pri uvajanju decentralizacija ne more zagotoviti pri~akovanih 
pozitivnih izbolj{av. Ravno nasprotno - {e posebej v kratkoro~ni perspek-
tivi decentralizacije, ki ni podprta z drugimi mehanizmi - obstoje~i problemi 
se lahko poglobijo in s tem ustvarijo dodatne možnosti za ve~ oblik "vlad-
nega neuspeha". Zaradi omenjenih dejstev je formalna predstavitev lo-
kalne in regionalne samouprave le prvi korak k dejanski decentralizaciji 
države in na poti k sodobnemu upravljanju, temelje~em na na~elih, pojasnjenih 
v Beli knjigi Evropske Komisije, ki definira glavne vrednote sodobnega 
upravljanja kot so odprtost, participacija, odgovornost, u~inkovitost in 
koherentnost. V okolju držav Srednje in Vzhodne Evrope morata biti de-
centralizacija in fiskalna decentralizacija uvedeni zelo pazljivo ter kot kom-
pleksen proces. Formalni prenos odgovornosti in sredstev mogo~e ne bo 
dovolj za pozitivne rezultate. Brez nujnih komplementarnih ukrepov bo 
fiskalna decentralizacija omogo~ila le transfer javnih sredstev iz rok central-
nih birokratov v roke lokalnih politikov in birokratov, služe~ njihovim zaseb-
nim interesom, ne pa državljanom kot prvotnim "lastnikom" sredstev. To 
tveganje je {e vedno zelo veliko v specifi~nem okolju držav Srednje in 
Vzhodne Evrope, kjer se lokalna demokracija {e vedno razvija skupaj z 
glavnimi vrednotami sodobnega upravljanja. Da bi reforme uspele, je 
treba upo{tevati vsaj naslednja pravila: decentralizacija naj bo razumljena 
le kot orodje in ne kot kon~ni cilj; decentralizacija ni enostavna in eno-
dimenzionalna strategija, njeni rezultati in vplivi se bodo razlikovali glede 
na ~as in okolje; da bi decentralizirali, so potrebne priložnost, sposobnost 
in pripravljenost; decentralizacijske strategije morajo upo{tevati vse 
glavne vidike, {e posebej zakonske, finan~ne, teritorialne in lastninske 
vidike tega procesa. 
 
 
 
 
